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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

--------------------------------------NANETTE DIXON, VAL HUMPHERYS,
and CARRIE HUMPHERYS,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 16876

vs.
WILLIAM STODDARD and DARLENE
STODDARD,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the heirs of Glen

s.

Humphreys to

enforce a Promissory Note.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury which found that there
had been a material and fraudulent alteration of the
Promissory Note.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek an order reversing the Judgment in the
District Court and entering Judgment for the Plaintiff for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the unpaid balance on the Note plus interest and costs, or,
in the alternative, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
William and Darlene Stoddard own a drugstore in Brigham
City.

In 1967, they agreed to buy the prescription items and

other saleable inventory from the drugstore owned by Glen
Humphreys, who was retiring.

s.

At Mr. Humphreys' request, the

parties entered into an Agreement (P-3) and Promissory Note
(R-3) which were drawn up by Mr. Humphreys' attorney.

The

Agreement provided that the value of the saleable inventory was
to be determined by the Rocky Mountain Wholesale Inventory Crew.
Defendant William Stoddard testified at trial that there was
to be a reconciliation of the inventory and the merchandise
received after the inventory was taken. (T-28)

The parties

also determined that the store inventory would be paid for as
the items were sold through the Defendants' store.

(R-24,25)

After making payments for several years, the Defendants stopped
when they found it impossible to sell a major part of the
inventory received under the Agreement.
enforce the Note.

Plaintiffs sued to

Defendants raised as a defense the fact that

the Promissory Note had been completed without their knowledge
or authorization since they had never received an inventory as
per the Agreement.
2
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At trial, Defendant William Stoddard was called as an
adverse witness by the Plaintiff and questioned concerning
the identity of his signature and the signature of his wife
on the Promissory Note.

(T-26,27)

On cross-examination,

the Defendant was permitted to testify where he was when he
signed the Note, who was present, and that he and his wife
signed the Note in blank.

The defendants had already admitted

in their Amended Answer that they had signed the Note in
blank. (R-42)

The Defendants also testified that they had

never received an inventory as provided in the Agreement
(R-40) and that some of the heirs had agreed to work out a
settlement on the unsaleable merchandise.

(T-46-48}

After the Plaintiffs and Defendants rested their cases, the
trial Judge gave appropriate instructions based on the pleadings
and evidence.

The jury, exercising their prerogative as trier

of fact, found that there had been a fraudulent and material
alteration of the P:romissory Note.

Plaintiffs moved for a

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict but were denied their
motion in a Memorandum Decision.

(R-133)

The Plaintiffs now appeal the verdict of the trial court
and seek a reversal or, in the alternative, a new trial based
on some recently discovered evidence.

A Motion for a new trial

based on this new evidence was previously denied by the District
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
3 digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Court in a Memorandum Decision.

(R-181)

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.

A.

PLAINTIFFS ARE SUBJECT TO THE DEFENSE OF UNAUTHORIZED
COMPLETION.
Since the Plaintiffs acquired the Promissory Note

"in taking over an estate," they are not holders in due
course. UCA 70A-3-302 (3) (b) •

Therefore, they are subject

to the defense of unauthorized completion. UCA 70A-3-306.
Defendant has the burden of establishing that the instrument
was completed without authorization, UCA 70A-3-115(2)

1

70A-3-307 and that such a completion consisted of a fraudulent and material alteration under 70A-3-407.

Upon meeting

this burden, the Defendants may be discharged under
70A-3-407(2) (a) if the contract is changed by the material
alteration.
B.

THE DEAD MAN STATUTE IS TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED.
In Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P.2d 122

(1946), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the purpose of the
dead man statute:
The purpose of the statute is to guard against
the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to a transaction with a deceased person

5 for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I~

by the surviving party, when the transaction
is involved in a lawsuit and death has sealed
the mouth of the other party. Furthermore,
the statute seeks to put the two parties upon
terms of equality in regard to giving evidence
of the transaction •••• It was never intended that
this section be used for the purpose of suppressing the truth. On the contrary, the statute's
sole purpose is to prevent the proving by false
testimony of claims against the estate of a
deceased person.at 125.
Since the danger of suppressing truthful testimony is
so real, the Court requires that the statute be strictly
construed.

Morrison v. Walker Bank and

Trust~

11 Utah

2d 416, 360 P.2d 1015 (1961).
The parties have presented themselves before the
court in an effort to achieve justice.

It does not seem

just that the Defendants' entire case should be swept aside
because of the unfortuitous demise of one of the parties.
McKormick's respected treatise on Evidence points out:
In seeking to avoid injustice to one side,
the statute-makers have ignored the equal
possibility of creating injustice to the
other • • • • A searching cross-examination
will usually, in case of fraud, reveal
discrepancies in the 'tangled web' of deception.
In any event, the survivor's disqualification
is more likely to balk the honest than the
dishonest survivor. McKormick, Evidence 65
(2d 2d.1972)
since the danger of suppressing honest, truthful testimony is inherent in this situation, the court's task would

6
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appear to be 1) the exercise of a heightened degree of
scrutiny to determine if §78-24-2 even applies to the
portions of testimony challenged by Plaintiffs and 2)
viewing

~efendants'

assertions of waiver and harmless

error in the best possible light.
C.

EVIDENCE THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE WAS SIGNED IN
BLANK WAS COMPETENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THE
DEAD MAN STATUTE.
In this case, the Plaintiff called Defendant William

Stoddard as an adverse witness to testify regarding the
identity of the signatures on the Promissory Note.
(T-26,27)

On cross-examination by defense counsel, the

Defendant testified that he had signed the document in a
basement apartment, that three other people were present,
and that he had signed the Promissory Note in blank.
It is clear from the trial record that Plaintiff was
the first to inquire into the transaction between the
Defendants and the decedent.

As stata:iin O'Gara v. Findley,

6 Utah 2d 102, 306 P.2d 1073 (1957):
He [the Plaintiff] is therefore in no position
to object when the adverse party explores the
subject more fully upon cross-examination of
the witness.
In Plain terms the statute does
not apply when the witness has been called to

7
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testify to the transaction by the executor
of the estate, the adverse party. at 1075
(emphasis added)
Therefore,the Plaintiff waived the dead man statute
as to the testimony regarding signatures in blank, thus
rendering the testimony competent evidence.
D.

EVEN IF THE TESTIMONY WERE NOT COMPETENT EVIDENCE,
ITS SUBMISSION TO THE JURY WAS HARMLESS ERROR SINCE
THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS EMPOWERED TO SUBMIT THE SAME
INFORMATION TO THE JURY AS A JUDICIAL ADMISSION.

It is the trial judge's responsibility to instruct
the jury as to the issues that must be decided in the case
and the applicable law so that the jury will understand its
duties.

Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564

(1960); Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701
(1961).

In this case the judge had the authority to

instruct the jury that the signature of the Promissory Note
in blank had been admitted in the pleadings and to explain
its impact on the issue of execution of the Note.

It appears

from the record that the trial judge did in fact make an
instruction regarding admission of the signature, but this
presumably refers to the testimony.

(R-100)

The judge could

just as well have instructed the jury regarding the admission

8
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in the pleadings if the testimony had not been allowed
in earlier.
E.

FROM THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL, THE JURY WAS
ENTITLED TO REACH THE VERDICT IT DID.
It is settled law that a reviewing court will not

disturb the jury's findings "unless clearly against the
weight and credibility of the evidence."

Bank v. Shivers

20 Utah 2d 25, 432 P.2d 339,340 (1967): see also Bezner v.
Continental Dry Cleaner, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (1967).
In this case the jury was informed that the Defendants
signed the Promissory Note in blank and that the amount was
not to be filled in until after an inventory performed by
The Rocky Mountain Wholesale Inventory Crew determined the
value of the store items.

Defendant William Stoddard also

testified that the inventory was to be reconciled with the
merchandise he received.

(T-28)

The jury was informed that

these arrangements were pursuant to the Agreement entered
into by the parties.

No evidence was introduced even as to

an inventory ever having been performed.

Therefore, the jury

was entitled to believe that the amount and date filled in
the blank spaces on the Promissory Note were material and
fraudulent alterations because done without authorization
and that the Defendant should be discharged from making

9
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further payments on the Note.
Furthermore, the comment made by the jury on the
verdict suggesting that the Plaintiffs remove the unsaleable items from the Defendants' basement does not indicate
confusion on the jury's part.

The comment is clearly in

response to the Defendant's testimony that unsaleable
items were still in his basement.

(T-48)

This testimony

was not objected to and was not excluded.

The objections

and exclusion came when defense counsel sought to introduce
some of the items into evidence.
F.

(T-48)

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 AND SPECIAL VERDICT NO. 1
WERE CORRECT.
The court's Instruction No. 2 (R-100) reminded the

jury of the fact that the Defendants had admitted they
signed the Promissory Note in blank.

As previously pointed

out, evidence regarding such signatures was competent.
Therefore, the jury was entitled to rely on it.

The remainder

of the instruction correctly sets forth the law as contained
in UCA 70 A-3-407 and the common law.
As to the special verdict, competent evidence regarding
fraudulent and material alteration of the Promissory Note
was introduced at trial and the jury was entitled to rely on
it and find that the Note was altered.

Burk v. Peters,
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though a correct statement of law, does not support
Plaintiffs' case because 1) the evidence of the signatures
admitted at trial was also presentable to the jury as a
judicial admission; 2) in Burk, the Plaintiff was held not
to have waived the dead man statute.

It is Defendants'

contention on appeal that Plaintiffs waived the dead man
statute by calling Defendant William Stoddard as an adverse
witness and questioning him about the transaction that was
"equally within the knowledge" of the Defendant and decedent.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS
CORRECT.
A.

THE NEW EVIDENCE COULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED IN TIME
TO MOVE FOR A NEW TRIAL IF DUE DILIGENCE HAD BEEN
EXERCISED.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (2)

indicates that the court may

set aside a judgment if there is "newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under 59(b) ."
provides:

Rule 59(b)

"A motion for a new trial shall be served not

later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment."
In Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962),
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the Utah Supreme court held:
In order to warrant the granting of a new trial
on the ground of belatedly discovered evidence,
relied on by the plaintiffs, it would appear
both that it 'by due diligence could not.~ave
been discovered in time to move for a new trial'·
and that such evidence was of sufficient substance
that there would be a resonable likelihood of a
different result. Otherwise, it is obious that
the ends of justice would not be served by
ordering a new trial. at 30
I

It has now been almost four years since the complaint bringing this action was filed.

In the two years and two months

that expired between the filing of the complaint and the
trial, the Plaintiffs have stated they searched for the
inventory records only three times.

(R-159)

It seems that

the due diligence requirement would call for more than one
search per year for such valuable evidence.

Furthermore,

the fact that the inventory was found among the decedent's
personal effects indicates that prior efforts to find the
inventory had not been as thorough and diligent as they
should have been.

In other words, a truly diligent search,

and surely several truly diligent searches of the decedent's
personal effects would have turned up this evidence.

Had it

not been for what the Plaintiffs saw as the broad, shieldlike protection of the dead man statute, perhaps a more
diligent search would have been conducted.
B.

THE NEW EVIDENCE WOULD NOT BRING ABOUT A DIFFERENT RESULT
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It is also necessary that there be a IEasonable likelihood
of a different result because of the newly discovered evidence.
The learned trial judge indiqated in a Memorandum Decision
that he did not think the new evidence would change the jury's
verdict.

(R-181)

Based on the testimony given at trialp it

appears that the trial judge was correct.
Defendant William Stoddard testified that after the
inventory was taken there was to be a reconciliation and
that such reconciliation was pursuant to the Agreement.
(T-28,29)

Although a provision for a reconciliation is not

expressly inoluded in the Agreement, it would be reasonable
for a jury to assume that the Defendants would desire a
reconciliation and that Defendant's testimony was merely
additional evidence of the intent of· the parties.

There

was also conflicting testimony regarding an agreement to
make a settlement regarding the unsaleable merchandise.
(T-24, 47-48)

A jury could reasonably conclude from this

that the parties were willing to work outside the terms
of the Agreement.
Since there was testimony indicating that the Agreement
was not the sole embodiment of the intent and wishes of the
parties, a jury could reasonably conclude that the

13
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inventory had to be accepted by the Defendants before
being included as the sum due on the Pranissory Note.
Therefore, the likelihood of the new evidence bringing
about a different result is not sufficient to justify a
new trial because even though the inventory amount
corresponds to the ampunt on the Note, it does not prove
that Defendants authorized the completion of the Note.
The trial judge did not . abuse his discretion by dismissing
the motion for a new trial.

POINT III
THE JURY'S FINDINGS ON ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The jury found that there had been a fraudulent and
material alteration of the Note and

th~t

the Plaintiffs did

not have enough evidence to support a verdict in their
favor.

Based on the evidence that led to these findings,

the jury could reasonably deny Plaintiffs' an award of
attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the verdict of the
trial court was supported by competent evide~ c and should be
upheld on appeal.

It is also respectfully submitted that a new
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trial based on recently discovered evidence should not be
granted because the evidence could have been discovered by
due diligence in time to move for a new trial and will not
bring about a different result.
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